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When Remand is Appropriate in Multidistrict 
Litigation 
Edward F. Sherman* 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1968 Multidistrict Litigation Act (the “MDL Act”) created 
the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (the “Panel”) to transfer 
multiple cases with “common questions of fact” to a single federal 
judge for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.1 
Transfer is authorized if the Panel determines that “transfers for 
such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and 
witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such 
actions.”2 The transfer to a single district court is made without 
consideration of personal jurisdiction over the parties and without 
having to meet federal venue requirements.3 The transferee court 
has broad authority to dispose of all motions and issues that arise 
in the pretrial context, including all discovery matters and 
dispositive motions such as those for dismissal and summary 
judgment. The Act provides that: “Each action so transferred shall 
be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such 
pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred 
unless it shall have been previously terminated . . . .”4 No 
guidelines are provided for determining when “the conclusion” of 
the proceedings occurs, and now, after almost fifty years of 
practice under the Act, significant issues remain as to when 
remand should take place. 
I. SELF-TRANSFER AND LEXECON 
For several decades after passage of the MDL Act, it became 
an accepted practice for transferee judges to use the power under 
section 1404(a) to transfer to a more convenient forum in order to 
keep MDL cases in their district for trial or disposition.5 Writing in 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by EDWARD F. SHERMAN. 
 1. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).  
 2. Id. 
 3. For an account of these developments, see Richard L. Marcus, Cure–All 
for an Age of Dispersed Litigation? Toward a Maximalist Use of the 
Multidistrict Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245 (2008). 
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).  
 5. See id. § 1404(a) (“For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in 
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other 
district or division where it might have been brought . . . .”). 
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1978, Judge Stanley Weigel reported that “[i]n point of fact, 
slightly less than five percent of the actions transferred by the 
Panel have been remanded.”6 It remains true that the great majority 
of cases are resolved in the transferee forum, and that most are 
resolved by some sort of settlement.7 But over time, the practice of 
transferee courts to dispose of the cases transferred to them came 
into question. 
From the start, there was a debate over whether transferring 
cases under the Act should allow transferee courts to do more than 
just prepare cases for trial.8 It was argued that the transferee judge 
would develop expertise in managing the litigation that could be of 
great benefit if that judge could hold on to the cases for trial, either 
individually or in the aggregate. This view was reflected in the 
practice of “self-transfer” that became dominant and was enshrined 
in a Panel regulation.9 The debate over allowing transferee courts 
to hold onto cases for trial mirrored the long-time debate over 
whether to aggregate cases in the first place. The interests of 
efficiency, economy, and consistency in resolution of like cases 
were cited in favor of aggregation.10 In opposition to aggregation 
were concerns for honoring the plaintiff’s choice of forum, 
individualized due process, and the jurisdictional integrity of the 
court where the suit was originally filed.11 That debate is still 
ongoing, enhanced in recent years by court hostility to class actions 
                                                                                                             
 6. Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 
Transferor Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 575, 583 (1978).  
 7. M. MARCUS, E. SHERMAN, & H. ERICHSON, COMPLEX LITIGATION: 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 169 (5th ed. 2010). 
 8. See Stephen Scotch-Marmo & Michael James Ableson, At What Price 
Efficiency? – Judicial Self-Assignment for Trial in Multidistrict Litigation, Prod. 
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 934 (Aug. 25, 2014) (reviewing the 
debate in the context of the passage of the Act). 
 9. The JPML has blessed self-transfer by Rule 14(b), which provides that 
the Panel will not send a case back for trial if the district court handling pretrial 
matters transfers the case to itself, and by case law holding that the JPML will 
not even consider remanding so long as the district court is considering a self-
transfer motion. See Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation, Rule 14(b), 277 F.R.D. 480 (2011) [hereinafter Panel Rules] 
(superseded, in part, by Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & 
Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998)); see also In re CBS Color Tube Patent Litig., 342 
F. Supp. 1403, 1405 (J.P.M.L. 1972) (“In view of the pendency of [a section 
1404(a)] motion, we expressly refrain from granting this motion for remand and 
interfering in matters within the discretion of the transferee judge.”).  
 10. Edward F. Sherman, Aggregate Disposition of Related Cases: The 
Policy Issues, 10 REV. LITIG. 231 (1991) (comparing policies favoring 
aggregation—such as economy, efficiency, and consistency of result—with 
policies disfavoring litigant autonomy and fairness in individual treatment). 
 11. Scotch-Marmo & Ableson, supra note 8 (discussing congressional 
testimony and court concerns over aggregation). 
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and academic concerns over class action abuses.12 The narrower 
debate over exactly when MDL cases should be remanded back to 
their original jurisdictions is the subject of this Symposium.13 
The self-transfer approach still had its limits. Self-transfer was 
possible only if the transferee judge sat in a district in which a case 
could originally have been brought. Furthermore, a high percentage 
of all cases settle before trial, and that is especially so when the 
MDL process—intended to foster settlement—is invoked. Thus, a 
large number of transferred cases would always be resolved by 
settlement accomplished under the jurisdiction of the transferee 
court. Finally, transferee judges have authority to rule on all pretrial 
matters, including dispositive motions such as motions to dismiss 
and for summary judgment.14 Thus, transferee courts could dispose 
of many of the cases transferred under MDL, obviating the need to 
remand to the original district where they were filed. 
Despite the broad acceptance of self-transfer pursuant to 
section 1404(a), the Supreme Court held that it was improper in the 
1999 decision of Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & 
Lerach.15 The Court concluded that the statutory requirement that, 
at the completion of pretrial proceedings, the action “shall be 
remanded . . . unless it shall have been previously terminated” did 
not contemplate that transferee courts would hold on to cases past 
the pretrial preparation stage.16 In Lexecon, the transferee judge 
had resolved all but one of the claims by summary judgment.17 
Over the plaintiff’s objections, the transferee court transferred the 
case to itself for trial of that claim pursuant to section 1404(a).18 
The defendant prevailed at trial, but the Supreme Court reversed 
because the statute “obligates the Panel to remand any pending 
case to its originating court when, at the latest, those pretrial 
proceedings have run their course.”19 The Court rejected the 
                                                                                                             
 12. See Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: 
Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 71 (2003); see generally Linda Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We 
Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 Emory. L.J. (forthcoming 
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2457429 
##, archived at http://perma.cc/F9YW-UZ94?type=pdf. 
 13. For an edited and excerpted transcript of the discussions at the 
Louisiana Law Review’s 2014 Symposium entitled “The Rest of the Story, 
Resolving the Cases Remanded by the MDL,” see 75 LA. L. REV. 342, 342–97 
(2014). 
 14. See text at notes 43 & 44, infra. 
 15. See 523 U.S. 26 (1998). 
 16. Id. at 35 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 17. Id. at 31.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. at 34. 
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defendant’s argument that the granting of the section 1404(a) 
motion constituted a termination that obviated remand, and 
concluded that the defendant “may or may not be correct that 
permitting transferee courts to make self-assignments would be 
more desirable than preserving a plaintiff’s choice of venue (to the 
degree that § 1407(a) does so), but the proper venue for resolving 
that issue remains the floor of Congress.”20 
II. MEANS OF AVOIDING REMAND AFTER LEXECON 
There are still ways for transferee judges to retain control of 
cases by doing something comparable to a section 1404(a) transfer. 
As the chair of the MDL Panel, Judge John G. Heyburn II, noted: 
“Transferee judges are nothing if not resourceful where necessity 
dictates and several appropriate strategies are available by which 
the Lexecon conundrum may be avoided.”21 He provided the 
following examples: 
[P]rovided the plaintiff is amenable and venue lies in the 
transferee district, the action could be refiled there. The 
parties could also agree to waive objections to venue. 
Alternatively, the transferee court could try a “bellwether” 
case that was originally filed in the transferee district, the 
result of which may promote settlement of the transferred 
actions in the MDL. Another option, suggested in the 
Lexecon opinion itself, is for the transferor court to transfer 
the action back to the transferee court under § 1404(a). Still 
another option would be for the transferee judge to follow 
the action to the transferor court after obtaining an 
intracircuit or intercircuit assignment.22 
The first three techniques listed by Judge Heyburn have been 
more fully described: 
Prior to recommending remand, the transferee court could 
conduct a bellwether trial of a centralized action or actions 
originally filed in the transferee district, the results of 
which (1) may, upon the consent of the parties to 
constituent actions not filed in the transferee district, be 
binding on those parties and actions, or (2) may otherwise 
promote settlement in the remaining actions. 
 
                                                                                                             
 20. Id. at 40. 
 21. John G. Heyburn II, A View from the Panel: Part of the Solution, 82 
TUL. L. REV. 2225, 2233 n.47 (2008).  
 22. Id. (citations omitted).  
2014] WHEN REMAND IS APPROPRIATE  459 
 
 
 
Soon after transfer, the plaintiffs in an action transferred for 
pretrial from another district may seek or be encouraged (1) 
to dismiss their action and refile the action in the transferee 
district, provided venue lies there, and the defendant(s) 
agree, if the ruling can only be accomplished in conjunction 
with a tolling of the statute of limitations or a waiver of 
venue objections, or (2) to file an amended complaint 
asserting venue in the transferee district, or (3) to otherwise 
consent to remain in the transferee district for trial.23 
Most of these techniques require the consent of the parties or 
the initiative of the plaintiff. They are thus not objectionable on the 
grounds that they deny the plaintiff’s choice of forum or the 
transferor judge’s authority over cases filed in his or her district. 
The technique of having the transferor judge transfer a case back to 
the transferee court under section 1404(a) can only be done if the 
transferor court finds that the limited conditions for transfer to a 
more convenient forum are satisfied.  
However, one of the suggested techniques—the assignment of 
the transferee judge to preside over the trial of the case in another 
circuit—has been questioned. The use of intercircuit assignment of 
transferee judges is an efficient way to allow the transferee judge 
to sit outside his or her district and to preside over the litigation, 
either as individual cases or in an aggregate trial. It has been used 
to allow judges with special expertise or time in their docket to try 
cases in a different circuit. It is particularly efficient in the MDL 
context because the transferee judge has typically lived with the 
litigation for a considerable period and developed extensive 
knowledge and expertise in managing it.  
This practice was challenged in an opinion by Chief Judge 
Alexander Kozinski of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit in In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices 
Litigation24 In that case, Chief Judge Kozinski received a letter from 
the Judicial Conference Committee on Intercircuit Assignments 
asking him to sign a Certificate of Necessity that would permit the 
transferee judge, Chief Judge Vratil of the District of Kansas, to 
appear in his circuit as a visiting judge to try the MDL cases.25 
Pretrial proceedings having been concluded, Judge Vratil had 
notified the parties that to “facilitate trial in an efficient and timely 
manner,” she would ask the Judicial Conference Committee to 
                                                                                                             
 23. Scotch-Marmo & Ableson, supra note 8, at n.61 (quoting 32-20P JAMES 
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 20.132 (3d ed. 2012)). 
 24. See 711 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 25. Id. at 1052. 
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designate her to handle the proceedings.26 Such requests are often 
granted routinely by circuit chief judges. The procedure for 
intercircuit assignments is contained in guidelines issued by the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, which 
Judge Kozinski described as based on necessity:  
A federal court in our circuit identifies a need for a visiting 
judge for a case or cases pending in that court. The need may 
be occasioned by a shortage of judges, or by the recusal or 
disqualification of all of the court’s judges; it may concern a 
single case or a multitude of cases; it may be for a single trial 
or hearing, or it may apply to scores of them. If the need 
can’t be satisfied by judges within the circuit, our Circuit 
Executive and her trusty staff identifies a judge or judges 
outside the circuit who are available and willing to serve. In 
this effort, they’re immensely aided by the Judicial 
Conference Committee on Intercircuit Assignments, whose 
invaluable and frequent help I gratefully acknowledge. Once 
a willing out-of-circuit judge has been identified, the chief 
judge of the borrowing circuit signs a Certificate of 
Necessity, which, not surprisingly, represents that an out-of-
circuit judge is needed for a particular case, location or time 
period.27  
The defendants objected to the request for assignment, and Chief 
Judge Kozinski denied the request.28 He did not accept the 
defendants’ objection that the procedure violated Lexecon as an 
attempt to resuscitate the “self-referral” doctrine, saying that Lexecon 
dealt with venue and not judicial assignment.29 But he found that the 
request violated the Chief Justice’s guidelines for assignments:  
[B]y signing the certificate, I’d be divesting Ninth Circuit 
district judges of cases that would, in the normal course, be 
assigned to them. Each of the cases was assigned to a local 
district judge prior to the MDL transfer. It’s my understanding 
that, when cases are transferred back to the originating 
districts, they’re automatically restored to the dockets of the 
judges to whom they had been assigned prior to the transfer. 
Or, if the judge isn’t available, the case is assigned to another 
district judge in that district, in accordance with local 
procedures—generally calling for random assignment. 
                                                                                                             
 26. Order at *1–2, In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 
MDL No. 1840 (D. Kan. Feb. 2013); Scotch-Marmo, supra note 8, at n.2. 
 27. In re Motor Fuel, 711 F.3d at 1052. 
 28.  Id. at 1052, 1054. 
 29. Id. at 1053–54. 
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By signing a Certificate of Necessity for the cases in 
question, I would, in effect, be removing the judges to 
whom the cases were originally assigned and transferring 
them to an out-of-circuit judge. I’m aware of no authority 
empowering the chief judge of the circuit to re-assign cases 
pending before other judges, or to remove cases from the 
district’s assignment wheel. Only if the presiding judge is 
recused or unable to serve, and the local district is unable to 
reassign the case according to its local procedures, will the 
chief judge of the circuit be called upon to bring in a judge 
from outside the district. For me to sign a Certificate of 
Necessity in the absence of such circumstances would 
constitute a serious encroachment on the autonomy of the 
district courts and also interfere with the random 
assignment of cases.30 
Chief Judge Kozinski viewed the Chief Justice’s guidelines as 
“directed strictly toward meeting judicial necessities” and opined 
that although “having the district judge who conducted MDL 
pretrial proceedings also preside over the trial of the case can 
improve judicial efficiency, preserve scarce judicial resources and 
enhance MDL judges’ control over their proceedings,” there is no 
authority for assignment to further those aims.31  
Chief Judge Kozinski did add that the guidelines might be 
amended to define the concept of “necessity” broadly and “thereby 
give chief circuit judges latitude to seek intercircuit assignment in 
these circumstances.”32 But the tenor of his opinion was that 
intercircuit transfers based on efficiency could encroach on the 
authority of transferor judges to resume rightful control over their 
cases upon completion of pretrial proceedings. An indication of his 
feelings in opposition to delaying remand can be found in his 
dissent in a later-reversed Ninth Circuit decision upholding self-
transfer in Lexecon. “Soon after the MDL process got underway,” 
he wrote, “a peculiar thing started happening: [transferee] [j]udges 
began to develop proprietary feelings toward the cases entrusted to 
them . . . .”33 In Motor Fuel, he expressed the hope that his opinion 
would “be the beginning of a productive discussion as to the 
proper way to handle [such situations].”34 This is consistent with 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. at 1054. 
 31. Id. at 1054–55. 
 32. See id. at 1055. 
 33. In re Am. Cont’l. Corp., 102 F. 3d 1524, 1540 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d by 
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998) 
(alteration in original). 
 34. In re Motor Fuel, 711 F.3d at 1055 (alteration in original). 
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the movement that some believe is growing to require early and 
routine remand of cases to transferor courts in the belief that 
individual trials are superior to aggregative settlements.35 
III .WHEN SHOULD REMAND OCCUR? 
It is the Panel’s responsibility to remand cases. The process for 
remand under the MDL Act is that the Panel will issue a 
Conditional Remand Order (CRO) upon the suggestion of the 
transferee judge—or upon motion by one or more of the parties or 
at the Panel’s own initiative—that the case is ready for remand.36 
Judge Heyburn, however, has said that when the transferee judge 
suggests remand, “the party seeking to vacate the CRO faces an 
uphill battle, as the Panel ‘gives great deference to a transferee 
judge’s suggestion that an action pending before [that judge] is ripe 
for remand.’”37  
After Lexecon, the transferee judge must remand upon the 
completion of pretrial proceedings.38 But exactly when is that? As 
seen by the myriad ways that a transferee court can comply with 
Lexecon and yet avoid immediate remand, the percentage of 
remanded cases remains low. Given that most of the techniques to 
avoid remand are not prohibited, a further question arises as to how 
early remand should occur. The generally accepted answer has 
been that a transferee judge should have considerable discretion as 
to timing in order to accomplish the goals of MDL transfer. But 
that view has been challenged more recently by contentions that 
disaggregation of MDL cases is desirable to assure the right to 
individual trials and preserve the jurisdictional interests of the 
transferor courts.39 In opposition is the view that early remand is not 
                                                                                                             
 35. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 
LA. L. REV. 399 (2014).  
 36. See Panel Rules, supra note 9, at Rule 10.2 (“Upon the suggestion of the 
transferee judge or the Panel’s own initiative, the Clerk of the Panel shall enter a 
conditional order remanding the action or actions to the transferor district court . . . 
(i) The Panel may, on its own initiative, also enter an order that the parties show 
cause why a matter should not be remanded.”). 
 37. Heyburn, supra note 21, at 2235. 
 38. See generally Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 
523 U.S. 26 (1998); see also Panel Rules, supra note 9, at Rule 10.1 (“Where 
the transferee district court terminates an action by valid order, including but not 
limited to summary judgment, judgment of dismissal and judgment upon 
stipulation, the transferee district court clerk shall transmit a copy of that order 
to the Clerk of the Panel. The terminated action shall not be remanded to the 
transferor court and the transferee court shall retain the original files and records 
unless the transferee judge or the Panel directs otherwise.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Scotch-Marmo, supra note 8. 
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required if the objectives of MDL pretrial transfer may still require 
the control of the transferee judge. This is essentially a policy issue 
only loosely governed by the MDL statute. The starting point is 
when it can be said that the pretrial objectives of MDL have been 
met.  
A. When Common-Issue Discovery Is Completed 
Supervision of discovery was a main impetus for the MDL Act. 
The electrical equipment price-fixing conspiracy that resulted in 
the much-publicized prosecutions of high-level corporate officials 
in the early 1960s brought an unprecedented avalanche of treble-
damage antitrust actions in the federal courts.40 Some 2000 suits 
were filed in 35 different districts. Because the suits were in 
different districts, Rule 42(a) consolidation was not possible.41 
Moreover, section 1404(a) procedures for transfer to a more 
convenient forum were inadequate to ensure that all the cases 
could be transferred to a single court. The courts were therefore 
forced to cope with the burden on an ad hoc basis, giving impetus 
to the creation of the Coordinating Committee for Multiple 
Litigation of the United States District Courts, composed of nine 
federal judges, which supervised nationwide coordinated discovery 
for all electrical equipment cases. Out of this experience came the 
1968 Multidistrict Litigation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, which created 
the Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer cases with 
“common questions of fact” to a single federal judge “for 
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”42  
A consideration by the Panel in determining whether to send 
cases to MDL is whether duplicate discovery in similar cases can 
thereby be avoided. According to Panel Chair Judge Heyburn, “the 
Panel focuses solely upon the potential for convenience, 
efficiencies, and fairness in pretrial proceedings centralized before 
a single court.”43 One factor is “whether the parties’ legitimate 
discovery needs are substantially similar in all of the proposed 
transferee actions.”44 Additionally, Judge Heyburn noted: 
[T]he Panel looks to whether similar facts are at issue with 
respect to the various claims in the different cases. The 
                                                                                                             
 40. See Phil C. Neal & Perry Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust 
Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621, 622 (1964). 
 41. See FED. R. CIV. P. 42(a) (“If actions before the court involved a 
common question of law or fact, the court may . . . (2) consolidate the actions.”). 
 42. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).  
 43. Heyburn, supra note 21, at 2237. 
 44. Id. 
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greater the factual commonality of the cases, the more 
likely it is that centralization will benefit the involved 
parties and the system as a whole. The more troublesome 
dockets to evaluate are those where the potential transferee 
cases may contain different groups of plaintiffs or 
defendants and may contain some differing legal claims, 
yet nevertheless may appear to require similar factual 
discovery.45  
Discovery schedules established by the transferee court provide 
some certainty as to when discovery is completed. Certain patterns 
of types of cases remanded due to discovery issues have emerged. 
Discovery relating only to individual cases, as opposed to common 
issue discovery, may be left to be done in individual cases on 
remand. For example pharmaceutical cases may require additional 
individualized plaintiff discovery that may be best left for remand, 
particularly on such issues as specific causation and damages. On 
the other hand, economic loss cases, such as antitrust, securities, 
and consumer fraud, are most likely to raise the need for more 
MDL-aggregated discovery. However, at least some individualized 
discovery may be desirable in the MDL court for purposes of 
definitive motions or settlement negotiations. That can sometimes 
be accomplished by allowing limited or targeted discovery so that 
the parties can assess what the totality of the individualized 
discovery would be. The transferee court must exercise its discretion 
in determining whether going forward with such discovery prior to 
remand would be useful.  
B. When All the Common Pretrial Preparation Issues Have Been 
Resolved so that the Cases are Ready for Individual Disposition on 
Remand  
The completion of MDL pretrial preparation occurs when all 
the necessary discovery and motions have been done and the cases 
are “in a can” to hand over to the transferor courts.  
The precedents are clear that a transferee judge has authority 
over all proceedings that literally take place “before trial.”46 That 
includes dispositive motions—such as motions for dismissal and 
summary judgment—and rulings as to evidence and witnesses that 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id. 
 46. In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., MDL No. 1840, 
2013 WL 1896985, at *4 (D. Kan. May 6, 2013). 
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will affect the trial itself.47 The transferee court’s rulings are law of 
the case that are binding on remand for trial unless there are 
changed circumstances.48 If transferor judges were permitted to 
upset the rulings of transferee judges, the result would be an 
undermining of the purpose and usefulness of transfer under 
section 1407 for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings 
because those proceedings would then lack the finality (at the trial 
court level) requisite to the convenience of witnesses and parties 
and to the efficient conduct of actions. The transferee judge thus 
has considerable discretion in determining what the pretrial issues 
are and, if he or she finds it useful, in segmenting them for 
disposition before remand.49 The fact that there are so few remands 
from MDLs indicates how a transferee MDL judge can often 
effectively dispose of pretrial matters so that settlement is likely. 
One reason that a transferee judge might decide a particular 
issue before trial, rather than leaving it for the remand court, is that 
by doing so there will be a uniform ruling applicable to all the 
cases on remand. The Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated 
Litigation50 and the Chinese Drywall Litigation51 provide examples 
of the transferee judge deciding thorny issues of law relating to 
such issues as choice of law and defenses. If the cases were 
remanded, there might not have been uniform rulings. 
A remand need not be total as to the entire case. If a transferee 
court retains limited jurisdiction to rule on certain common issues 
(which could be on the request of the remand court), certain issues 
                                                                                                             
 47. In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 169 F.R.D. 632, 
636–37 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding that a transferee judge can limit the number of 
trial witnesses).  
 48. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.133 (4th ed. 2004) 
(“Although the transferor judge has the power to vacate or modify rulings made 
by the transferee judge, subject to comity and ‘law of the case’ considerations, 
doing so in the absence of a significant change of circumstances would frustrate 
the purposes of centralized pretrial proceedings.”). For an examination of the 
“law of the case” problems that arise in multidistrict litigation, see Joan 
Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in Consolidated and Transferred 
Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1987). 
 49. See Edward F. Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives 
and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 REV. LITIG. 691 (2006) 
[hereinafter Sherman, Segmenting Aggregate Litigation].  
 50. See, e.g., In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 
644 (E.D. La. 2009); See also Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model For 
Resolving Complex Litigation If a Class Action is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2205, 2221 n.80 (2008) [hereinafter Sherman, MDL Model]. 
 51. In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., 753 F.3d 521 
(5th Cir. 2014) (ruling on such issues as liability for acts of subsidiary and alter 
ego, minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction, and vacation of default 
judgment). 
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could go back to it later for resolution—for example, to determine 
damages on a standard applicable to all cases. This could insure 
more uniformity of result among the cases remanded to many 
different jurisdictions. Group remands could also take place, for 
example, as to all the cases represented by the same law firm when 
there is an opportunity for settlement of all those cases or when 
there are certain categories of cases that can be settled or disposed 
of.  
It has been suggested that plaintiffs’ attorneys might oppose 
remand unless their attorneys’ fees are determined and awarded in 
the MDL court. Assuming that a global settlement has not been 
achieved, remand might be partial because a number of dispositive 
and other issues have been decided by the MDL judge. In that case, 
it would seem appropriate to award attorneys’ fees for the common 
benefits conferred on the plaintiffs up to that point. There does not 
seem to be any precedent dealing with this issue, no doubt in part 
because of the low level of MDL remands. 
C. When the Transferee Judge No Longer Believes that a Global 
Settlement Is Possible if Remand Is Deferred. 
1. The Settlement Responsibility of a Transferee Judge 
One of the duties of a transferee judge is to attempt to achieve 
settlement.52 The MDL proceeding in federal court can provide a 
unique focus for settlement promotion and other pretrial activities. 
Since settlement is a primary goal of an MDL judge, that judge 
may keep the MDL cases when pretrial matters have been largely 
resolved so long as there seems to be momentum towards 
settlement. But if there is little hope of settlement, the MDL judge 
may move to remand. An expression of intent to remand may also 
be used by an MDL judge to stimulate the parties to settle. So the 
timing of remand can be tied to ongoing settlement negotiations. 
Deference to the transferee judge as to whether the route he or 
she is pursuing to achieve settlement is usually accorded. But at 
some point, the Panel may decide that successful settlement is 
unlikely and call for remand. The asbestos MDL provides a lesson 
                                                                                                             
 52. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 20.132 (4th ed. 2004) (“One 
of the values of multidistrict proceedings is that they bring before a single judge 
all of the federal cases, parties, and counsel comprising the litigation. They 
therefore afford a unique opportunity for the negotiation of a global settlement. 
Few cases are remanded for trial; most multidistrict litigation is settled in the 
transferee court. As a transferee judge, it is advisable to make the most of this 
opportunity and facilitate the settlement of the federal and any related state 
cases.”).  
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in realizing that MDL aggregation has been unsuccessful, although 
the solution there was not to remand the cases to the original 
jurisdictions but for the MDL judge to take strict measures through 
pretrial motions and the imposition of strict discovery requirements 
to weed out many unmeritorious cases.53 
The MDL judge necessarily has broad discretion in deciding 
whether remand of cases—either individually or in a group—will 
serve the interests of the MDL statute. For example, it has been 
noted that after a plaintiffs’ steering committee (PSC) is appointed, 
a number of remand motions for cases are often filed by attorneys 
not selected. There may be myriad reasons for such motions. For 
example, a plaintiff’s attorney may fear that his cases will be 
caught in “the black hole” of the MDL54 and could be settled or 
tried more quickly if remanded. But such partial remands may 
reduce the MDL judge’s leverage to obtain a global settlement. 
Another (less valid) reason could be that the attorneys not selected 
for the PSC are seeking to put pressure on the PSC attorneys or 
judge to give them a larger role in the MDL litigation. If that is the 
case, the judge might be wary of granting remand because it would 
hurt the client who is really not financially able to prosecute his 
case apart from the MDL. In short, transferee court decisions to 
remand can involve complex considerations weighing such critical 
factors as the impact on strategic choices and on the ultimate 
success of settlement that are not achieved by a routine rule of 
earliest possible remand. 
2. Unique Advantages of MDL 
MDL has emerged in recent years as an alternative to class 
actions for case aggregation. An MDL transferee judge need not 
rely on the class action, with its demanding requirements, to 
achieve the benefits of aggregation and promote a global 
settlement. In fact, in most mass tort cases today, granting of class 
certification is unlikely.55 Furthermore, although a federal 
transferee judge does not have jurisdiction over related state cases, 
settlement negotiations as to the federal cases can be coordinated 
with the attorneys in the state cases, and the federal MDL can 
serve as a catalyst for a global settlement. As demonstrated in 
Vioxx, joint negotiations between lawyers in the state and federal 
                                                                                                             
 53. See infra text accompanying notes 68–82. 
 54. See Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability 
Multidistrict Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER 
L.J. 97, 126 (2013). 
 55. See Sherman, MDL Model, supra note 50, at 2208. 
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actions, and the collaboration of state judges with the federal MDL 
judge, can bridge the jurisdictional divide to accomplish an 
aggregate settlement without resort to class actions.56  
Another advantage of the MDL process is to enable a global 
settlement that encompasses state court cases on the same matter. 
There is no similar mechanism in the MDL Act that would permit 
transfer of similar cases from state courts. In many mass tort 
litigations, there are a sizable number of suits, both individual and 
class action, in both federal and state courts. This can result in 
certification of conflicting class actions and give rise to 
complicated federalism issues as to the power of a federal court to 
enjoin the state actions.57 If the federal cases are transferred by the 
Panel to a transferee judge, a settlement can only bind the 
transferred federal cases if there is a global settlement involving 
both the parties and their attorneys from the state courts as well. In 
In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation,58 the transferee judge, 
Judge Fallon, involved state-court judges with large dockets of 
Vioxx cases in settlement discussions.59 More generally, federal 
MDL judges may coordinate with state judges presiding over 
similar cases. An experienced defense-side lawyer observed that 
seeking MDL centralization may be an effective way of persuading 
state-court judges to follow the federal leader: “Without an MDL 
proceeding, there is no obvious leader among the federal judges 
handling federal cases. It can thus be very difficult to convince 
state court judges to follow the lead of any one particular federal 
judge.”60  
The global settlement achieved in the Vioxx MDL included 
both the federal MDL suits and state court cases.61 This was 
accomplished by requiring plaintiffs’ attorneys who wanted to 
participate in the settlement to submit enrollment forms for 100% 
of their Vioxx clients within a limited time period. More than 95% 
of the attorneys in both the federal and state cases enrolled and 
accepted the terms of the settlement. An MDL settlement can bind 
                                                                                                             
 56. See, e.g., Sherman, MDL Model, supra note 50; see generally In re 
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. La. 2006). 
 57. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, Antisuit Injunction and Notice of 
Intervention and Preclusion: Complementary Devices to Prevent Duplicative 
Litigation, 1995 BYU L. REV. 925, 940–41 (1995). 
 58. Vioxx, 239 F.R.D. at 450. 
 59. Sherman, MDL Model, supra note 50, at 2214. 
 60. Mark Herrmann, To MDL or Not to MDL? A Defense Perspective, 24 
LITIGATION 43, 46 (1998). 
 61. See Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, 
Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2336–37 
(2008). 
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those parties that agree to it. In Vioxx, the state-court plaintiffs and 
their attorneys obviously found the settlement achieved in the 
federal MDL to be satisfactory and enrolled within the time 
period.62  
MDL transferee judges have a number of creative ways to try 
to accomplish global settlements. One of the most promising has 
been bellwether trials of a small number of representative cases 
that are filed (or dismissed and refiled) in the transferee district, as 
was done in Vioxx. The information provided to the attorneys 
regarding strengths and weaknesses across the spectrum of related 
cases helps them to assess the value of the consolidated litigation 
and makes possible a more reasoned decision as to an aggregate or 
global settlement.  
3. A Shift Toward Routine Remand Without Encouragement of 
Settlement? 
In March 2014, the Louisiana Law Review hosted a Symposium 
entitled “The Rest of the Story: Resolving the Cases Remanded by 
the MDL.” Professor Elizabeth Chamblee Burch’s article in this 
Symposium is an intelligent and spirited critique of delayed remand 
of MDL cases and of the role of transferee judges in promoting 
settlement.63 The Article urges that early remand become “the 
norm” so that adverse consequences of transferee judges holding on 
to cases are avoided.64 The adverse consequences are said to include 
errors in private, global settlements that are non-appealable; not 
having local judges familiar with state laws when state substantive 
laws are involved; aggregate settlements that include coercive terms 
designed to control stakeholders’ interests at the expense of non-lead 
attorneys and plaintiffs; not having jury trials that bring a 
community’s diverse perspectives and norms to bear on fact finding; 
global settlements that encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to file weak 
claims; giving defendants strategic benefits of centralization and 
global settlement; and allowing transferee judges to receive self-
interested benefits.  
It is not the province of this Article to evaluate all those claims. 
Many of them go beyond the issue of remand that is the topic of 
                                                                                                             
 62. The settlement also required that 85% of the plaintiffs in pending cases 
enroll in order for the settlement to take effect. This has been criticized as 
raising “the prospect that consent is less than voluntary.” See Burch, supra note 
35, at 14, 16. This is a common requirement insisted on by defendants to insure 
that settlement buys genuine peace and that plaintiffs’ attorneys do not cherry 
pick strong cases and withhold them from the settlement. 
 63. See generally Burch, supra note 35. 
 64. See id. at 413.  
470 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
this Symposium to criticize both global settlements and case 
aggregation itself. Suffice it to say that a number of the claims do 
not seem to be supported under the actual practice of MDL 
transferee courts.  
Objecting to the encouragement of settlement in MDL, Professor 
Burch’s Article asserts that “coaxing settlement strays furthest from a 
judge’s adjudicative role.”65 It correctly finds a pro-settlement bias in 
both the Panel and transferee judges. However, as reflected in case 
precedents applying the Act, as well as the Manual for Complex 
Litigation, encouragement of settlement is a primary objective of 
MDL practice in the interests of reducing the costs in both time and 
money of full-bore individual litigation. The charge that MDL 
assignments are “plum judicial assignments” from which transferee 
judges receive “self-interested benefits from settling high profile 
cases,”66 seems contrary, from my experience, to the performance of 
transferee judges who are selected by the Panel for their reputation for 
fairness as well as their ability and experience in aiding the parties to 
settle.  
Professor Burch’s Article sees “evidence that a normative shift 
may be underway”67 that will make early remand “routine.”68 As has 
been noted, there certainly has been a movement in opposition to case 
aggregation and its aspects like delayed remand and promotion of 
global settlements. As an extension of the aggregation debate, MDL 
has come under attack as a means of avoiding court-imposed 
limitations on what some in the defense bar and business see as 
excessive settlements. A much narrower issue is whether, as argued in 
Professor Burch’s article, the MDL Panel “has abdicated its proper 
role” concerning remand and transferee judges should tighten their 
standards for ordering remands.69 The Article cites two developments 
as indicating a “normative shift”—the investigations of the ABA TIPS 
Asbestos Task Force, and the experience of the transferee judges in 
the massive asbestos MDL that has been called “a black hole.”  
a. The ABA TIPS Asbestos Task Force 
The ABA TIPS Task Force,70 after holding hearings, has not as 
of the date of publication of this Article, issued its final report and 
                                                                                                             
 65. Id. at 416. 
 66. Id. at 417. 
 67. Id. at 402. 
 68. Id. at 422. 
 69. Id. at 400 (quoting John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, 
Evaluating and Improving the MDL Process, 38 LITIGATION 27, 31 (2012)). 
 70. The author of this Article is one of the seven members of the Task 
Force.  
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recommendations.71 The focus of the Task Force was not 
deficiencies in the MDL process, remand practice, or global 
settlements. The focus was the handling of asbestos cases, and 
particularly the issue of discovery of information concerning 
payments by the various asbestos trusts and concern over “double 
dipping” by claimants.72 The Task Force made no significant 
examination of MDL practice other than in the context of the 
particular asbestos MDL. The Task Force hearings did not concern 
transferee judge practice, global settlements, or time of remand. If 
MDL practice is to be examined, it will require a very different 
investigation than that of the Task Force. 
b. The Asbestos Black Hole Experience 
Asbestos litigation is the longest, most expensive mass tort in 
U.S. history, involving more than 8,400 defendants and 730,000 
claimants as of 2002.73 Asbestos cases were difficult to get 
certified as class actions because of the time often required for 
medical conditions to manifest themselves and the fact that 
plaintiffs were often exposed to many different products under 
very individualized circumstances, thus not satisfying the 
requirement of “predominance of common questions.”74  
After many refusals of courts to certify class actions in asbestos 
suits against manufacturers, the Fifth Circuit in 1973 approved class 
certification in an asbestos case.75 Over the following decade, a 
number of courts, both federal and state, certified asbestos class 
actions—often leading to settlements—after the asbestos manufacturer 
had gone into bankruptcy. However, the class action solution to the 
asbestos crisis was short-lived, and the class action device was 
markedly restricted as a means of aggregate disposition of asbestos 
cases.  
Reacting to what were considered excesses in class action 
practice, a number of circuit courts imposed stricter standards for 
                                                                                                             
 71. Georgene Vairo, Lessons Learned by the Reporter: Is Disaggregation 
the Answer to the Asbestos Mess?, 88 TUL. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (2014). 
 72. Id. at 1048–49. 
 73. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION, at vii, xxv, 70 
(RAND Corp. 2005). 
 74. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (“[T]he questions of law or fact common to 
class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members. . . .”). 
 75. See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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class certification, particularly as to mass torts.76 In addition, a 
series of Supreme Court decisions severely undercut global 
settlements in class actions.77 Given the failure of class actions to 
resolve asbestos cases, the MDL device was turned to. “In contrast 
to the stringent rules that govern class actions, MDL is a looser and 
more flexible structure allowing for transfer and consolidation 
based on pragmatic considerations.”78 Also, unlike class actions 
where the named plaintiffs are the only formal party and are in a 
fiduciary capacity to represent the absent class members, every 
plaintiff in an MDL would have to file suit. Thus the issue of 
adequate representation of absent persons—who may not even 
know of the class action until notice is given upon settlement—is 
lessened in MDL’s.  
Five times during the late 1970s and 1980s, petitions to 
consolidate asbestos cases through MDL transfer were filed.79 
However, the Panel did not consolidate the cases, apparently 
deferring to the individual federal courts to resolve asbestos 
litigation through individual or class dispositions.80 However, the 
attempts of the individual courts had not made marked reductions 
in the backlogs. In 1991, the Panel gave in and transferred all 
                                                                                                             
 76. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995); 
In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069 (6th Cir. 1996); Castano v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).  
 77. In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), the Court 
addressed a settlement where twenty asbestos manufacturers reached an 
agreement with leading asbestos plaintiff’s lawyers. The settlement was made 
on behalf of all persons in the U.S. who had been exposed occupationally to 
defendants’ asbestos products. Id. at 602. The settlement included the claims of 
persons who had not manifested the disease. Id. at 603. The Supreme Court 
found that the attempt to lump all future claimants together in a single class 
action violated the class action rule. Id. at 625–27. Among other things, it noted 
conflicts of interest between those with presently manifested disease and future 
claimants. Id. at 627. In Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), the 
Supreme Court overturned the certification of a settlement class, finding that 
there had been inadequate examination of whether there was in fact a limited 
fund. But more importantly, the Court said it was not contemplated that “the 
mandatory class action codified in subdivision (b)(1)(b) would be used to 
aggregate unliquidated tort claims on a limited fund rationale.” Id. at 843. The 
Court also restated the Amchem objections to class actions brought on behalf of 
both those with present medical conditions and those with only possible “future” 
injuries. Id. at 847. The Amchem and Ortiz decisions effectively brought an end 
to attempts to use class actions to craft broad global settlements of asbestos 
cases and to resolve future asbestos claims where no injury was manifested or 
suit filed. 
 78. Sherman, MDL Model, supra note 50, at 2209. 
 79. See generally Edward F. Sherman, The Evolution of Asbestos Litigation, 
88 TUL. L. REV. 1021 (2014). 
 80. Robreno, supra note 54, at 111.  
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26,000 asbestos cases pending in federal courts to Judge Charles R. 
Weiner in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.81 Judge Weiner 
undertook to achieve a global solution, appointing a steering 
committee of prominent plaintiffs’ lawyers who negotiated a 
global settlement with a group of twenty companies.82 That 
settlement was rejected by the Supreme Court in Amchem Products 
Inc. v. Windsor.83 Thus, after many years of encouraging a global 
settlement, the MDL process was left with having to try other 
methods. The asbestos MDL cases were ultimately transferred to 
Judge Eduardo C. Robreno of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
after the death of Judge Weiner. Judge Robreno noted that “[t]his 
stage of the litigation led some litigants to refer to MDL-875 as a 
‘black hole,’ where cases disappeared forever from the active 
dockets of the court.”84 Perversely, a reduction in the backlog of 
cases was aided by plaintiffs’ lawyers avoiding federal court and 
filing instead in state courts. Judge Robreno eschewed aggregate or 
global approaches. In 2009, he dismissed thousands of cases based 
on the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with his administrative order 
requiring filing of reports and other discovery materials.85 He also 
suggested to the MDL Panel that no more tag-along cases (suits 
filed after the original MDL transfer) be sent to him.86  
Judge Robreno has considerably reduced the federal MDL 
docket, applying strict schedules and weeding out many cases for 
insufficient proof of harm or exposure thus reducing the bargaining 
power of plaintiff’s inventory lawyers. On the other hand, from a 
plaintiff’s perspective, there is a concern that meritorious cases 
have also been caught up in this drive. Some state court asbestos 
case dockets have also been reduced in states where an MDL-like 
court was created for transfer of asbestos cases.87 
                                                                                                             
 81. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 424 
(J.P.M.L. 1991). 
 82. Robreno, supra note 54, at 112–13. The settlement also established the 
Center for Claims Resolution (CCR) with a claims process for determining 
whether the eligibility of class members for payments, that also included 
alternative dispute resolution features.  
 83. See supra note 76. 
 84. Robreno, supra note 54, at 111.  
 85. Id. at 137–38. Called “Lone Pine orders,” many courts require the 
submission of specifics as to exposure and medical history early in asbestos 
litigation. Id. at 138. 
 86. Id. at 185. 
 87. Vairo, supra note 71, at 1056. Judge Mark Davidson, who was assigned 
all the Texas asbestos cases, testified before the Asbestos Task Force concerning 
use of similar techniques such as setting tight schedules for presentation of 
supporting evidence by plaintiffs. Id. at 1058–59.  
474 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75 
 
 
 
The asbestos MDL experience is sui generis. The vast number 
of cases, individualized issues, bankruptcy of the principal 
manufacturers, and difficulty of weeding out non-severe and non-
meritorious cases were distinctive. The MDL experience proved 
that attempts by the earlier transferee judges to dispose of the cases 
through settlements were inadequate, and it was Judge Robreno’s 
imposition of strict schedules and pretrial demands for supporting 
evidence that began to shrink the backlog. Far from demonstrating 
that transferee judges hold on to cases too long and refuse to 
remand, that experience was resolved by the transferee court itself 
and not by remanding back to the transferor courts. The fact is that 
the “shift” claimed to be taking place in remand practice is not 
supported by either the ABA Task Force investigation or the 
asbestos MDL experience. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg 
Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, transferee courts to whom the Panel 
on Multidistrict Litigation transfers cases for MDL treatment are 
required to remand cases upon the completion of pretrial proceedings. 
Just when that should occur is subject to dispute. Both courts and the 
Panel have favored using a variety of techniques to permit transferee 
courts to hold on to cases when, in their discretion, there is still a 
chance of resolution through motions or settlement. The primary 
categories in which immediate remand has been avoided are 
considered and evaluated: when common-issue discovery is 
completed; when all the common pretrial preparation issues have been 
resolved so that the cases are ready for individual disposition on 
remand; and when the transferee judge believes that a global 
settlement is no longer possible if remand is deferred. A movement in 
recent years has called for earlier remand and, in particular, that 
transferee judges not keep cases even if there is a possibility of 
resolution or settlement. The investigations of the ABA TIPS Task 
Force on Asbestos and the asbestos MDL “black hole” experience 
indicate that actions by transferee judges in setting tight schedules and 
requiring proof of such elements as exposure and harm can be 
effective as opposed to early and routine remand. Successes in 
achieving global settlements in such MDL cases as Vioxx provide 
support for continuing to give transferee judges broad discretion as to 
the timing of remand. 
